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Executive Summary 
The purpose of this report is to examine the effect of 
qualitative restrictions on internationally traded goods. 
The case of the European Community ban on the use 
of hormones in livestock production illustrates the con-
sequences of these types of restrictions. 
Quality restrictions include such measures as sanitary 
regulations, product definitions, grades, and production 
or processing standards. Normally, they are applied to 
both domestic and imported products. Although they 
are often motivated by legitimate health or safety con-
cerns, many of these measures can be seen as a kind of 
trade barrier used to protect domestic producers from 
foreign competition. 
The economic effects of quality restrictions differ from 
those of the conventional trade barriers: Import tariffs, 
import quotas, and voluntary export restraints (VERs). 
Tariffs lead to higher prices in the importing country, 
increased production, lower consumption, and a reduc-
tion in imports. If a country is a major importer, the 
tariff will lead to depressed world prices. Tariffs generate 
government revenue. Ordinary tariffs contribute less to 
world price instability than other forms of protection. 
The variable levy is a type of tariff that has the same 
destabilizing effects as quotas and VERs. 
Import quotas restrict the quantity imported, causing 
the price to rise in the country imposing the quota. The 
static effects are the same as those for import tariffs 
except for the disposition of the revenue, known as the 
quota rent, generated by the quota. Tariff revenues be-
long to the government, while quota rents generally ac-
crue to private traders. VERs are the same as import 
quotas but are administered by the exporting country 
The quota rents generated by a VER are retained in the 
exporting country. Because both quotas and VERs pre-
vent world price variation from influencing producer 
and consumer decisions, they are more destabilizing than 
ordinary tariffs. 
The economic effects of quality restriction are more 
complicated. In extreme cases, no producers in other 
countries can comply with the regulation and the coun-
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try implementing the quality restriction ceases to trade. 
If this occurs, internal prices may increase greatly and 
the world price may be depressed. In general, qUality 
restrictions likely will lead to higher domestic prices 
although the benefit to producers may be offset by higher 
production costs. Consumers will pay higher prices and 
have fewer choices, although regulations may be needed 
if the market fails to eliminate harmful products. The 
volume of trade may be reduced, depending on how 
many producers in other countries can comply with the 
regulation. Quality restI.ictions do not generate quota 
rents. If the primary motivation for a quality restriction 
is to protect producers from foreign competition, the 
economic effects are likely to be worse than those gen-
erated by more conventional trade barriers. 
The economic effects of a specific quality regulation 
are analyzed. The example studied is the European Com-
munity (EC) ban on the use of hormones in livestock 
production. This regulation will also be applied to im-
ported livestock products and may have a Significant 
impact on the world market for edible offals, a product 
extenSively imported by the EC 
Econometric estimates of the economic relationships 
indicate that the hormone ban could cause EC edible 
offal prices to increase by as much as 45 percent. Con-
sumption is predicted to fall by 12 percent and the reduc-
tion in world demand due to the EC withdrawal from 
the market could cause the world price of edible offals 
to fall almost 35 percent. These estimates represent 
upper limits and the actual effects of the hormone ban 
are likely to be more moderate. Nevertheless, it appears 
that the EC policy will have a Significant impact on the 
world market for edible offals. 
A critical issue in evaluating the impact of quality re-
strictions is the problem of distinguishing between reg-
ulations reflecting legitimate health and safety concerns 
and those that are simply another way to eliminate 
foreign competition. This is an important problem in 
political economy and requires further research. 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to present an analysis of 
the effect of qualitative restrictions on internationally 
traded goods and to illustrate the consequences of these 
measures with a specific example: The case of the Euro-
pean Community (EC) hormone ban and its implications 
for trade in edible offals. Qualitative restrictions include 
measures such as sanitary regulations, product defmi-
tions, grades, and production or processing standards. 
When a country establishes regulations of this nature, it 
must also apply the regulations to imported goods. If it 
does not, goods not meeting the standards would enter 
the market and undermine the regulation. The necessity 
of extending domestic quality regulations to imported 
goods opens up the possibility of using these regulations 
to protect domestic producers from foreign competition. 
Although quality restrictions are often motivated by 
legitimate health or safety concerns, many of these meas-
ures can be seen as barriers to trade. 
A recent case from Germany illustrates the nature of 
the problem. A law dating back to 1516 specifies the 
ingredients legally permitted in beer. This law, the 
Reinheitsgebot, stipulates that only yeast, malted barley, 
hops, and water can be used to brew beer (Agra Europe, 
March 13, 1987). Recent German legislation extended 
the beer regulation to imported beer. In effect, the old 
Reinheitsgebot was used to prevent beer imports from 
other European countries where additives or other ingre-
dients such as rice or corn are used to brew beer. The 
European Court of Justice ruled that this ban on imports 
of foreign beers was a barrier to trade aimed at other 
members of the EC. Because trade barriers between EC 
members are generally not allowed, Germany has been 
instructed to lift its ban on beer imports. The German 
government had argued that a legitimate health concern 
existed because Germans drink more beer than others 
and could be harmed by heavy consumption of the addi-
tives used in beers from other countries. The Court did 
not accept this argument, ruling that the law was actually 
a trade barrier designed to protect German beer produc-
ers from foreign competition (Agra Europe, March 13, 
1987). 
Determining whether a quality regulation is a trade 
barrier or a legitimate measure to protect public health 
and safety is a complicated problem. Scientific evidence 
that certain substances are harmful is not always conclu-
sive. Moreover, quality differences will be taken into 
account, in many cases, through the normal functioning 
of the market. On the other hand, some quality problems 
are particularly difficult to detect and could be danger-
ous to human health if left unregulated. For example, 
salmonella bacteria, a common health hazard arising 
from unsanitary livestock slaughter and processing pro-
cedures, are not visible to the naked eye. However, in 
many instances, it is unclear that quality regulations are 
necessary to protect human health or safety. To the extent 
that quality regulations applied to imported goods are 
trade barriers, they will serve to protect domestic pro-
ducers and limit the choices available to consumers. 
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The use of quality restrictions as barriers to trade is 
a particularly important issue as the world enters a new 
round of trade negotiations. Agricultural subsidies will 
be included in the new round of multilateral trade negoti-
ations (MTN) being conducted throu~ the General Ag-
reement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Previous rounds 
have made progress in establishing rules for international 
trade and limiting conventional trade barriers such as 
import tariffs and quotas. However, movements toward 
freer trade often result in efforts to circumvent the new 
rules. For example, elimination or reduction of industrial 
tariffs was followed by a proliferation of "non-tariff" bar-
riers such as import quotas. As nations move to limit 
import quotas, one can expect greater use of voluntary 
export restraints or other means to protect domestic 
producers. In this setting, quality regulations may be-
come particularly attractive as a barrier to trade that is 
justifiable as a measure to ensure the quality and safety 
of the goods allowed in internal markets. 
The working hypothesis underlying this study is that 
nations will take whatever action they can to protect 
their domestic markets at the same time they are 
negotiating reductions in protection. In industrial na-
tions, the producer generally is protected, while less 
developed countries tend to intervene on behalf of the 
consumer. Thus, we predict that as progress is made in 
reducing agricultural barriers in the GATT negotiations, 
governments in industrial countries will begin to seek 
out new methods to protect agricultural producers. One 
method they are likely to discover fairly rapidly is the 
use of quality regulations. 
The experience of the EC supports these predictions. 
One of the basic principles of a common market such 
as the EC is that no trade barriers should exist between 
the members of the community. This principle led to 
the gradual elimination of tariffs and import quotas be-
tween the countries in the EC and the establishment of 
a common external tariff applied to non-EC countries. 
Eliminating agricultural trade barriers within the EC, 
however, may result in shifts in the location of agricul-
tural production. These shifts occur as less efficient pro-
ducers in one region go out of business and more efficient 
producers in other areas expand their operations. These 
changes can be socially disruptive; therefore, it is not 
surprising that a variety of unconventional protective 
measures has surfaced within the EC. Rejuvenation of 
the German beer law is one example. Others include 
defmitions of the ingredients allowed in French and Ita-
lian pasta; prevention of pork imports from Spain where 
African swine fever has not been eradicated; Danish rules 
on reusable packaging for beer, mineral water, and soft 
drinks; and the entire agri-monetary system (Peterson, 
1985; Harris, Swinbank, and Wilkerson; Agra Europe, Feb-
ruary 6, 1987). Some of the quality regulations in indi-
vidual EC countries effectively protect their producers 
from competition from producers in other EC countries 
even though protection violates a basic principle of a 
common market. 
If the EC experience is an indication of a likely re-
sponse to agricultural trade liberalization, the use of qual-
ity regulations to restrict trade may increase. In this 
context, it is important to understand the effects of this 
type of trade barrier. In the first section of the report, 
the effects of quality restrictions on prices, supply, de-
mand, trade, and producer and consumer welfare are 
analyzed and contrasted with import tariffs, import 
quotas, and voluntary export restraints. The second sec-
tion of the report is devoted to analyzing a specific case: 
The EC ban on the use of hormones (growth promotants) 
in livestock production and its probable effect on the 
world edible offal market. Conclusions and suggestions 
for further research are presented in the final section of 
the report. 
II. The Economic Impact of Quality Restrictions And Other Trade Barriers 
A detailed discussion of the economic impact of tariffs, 
import quotas, voluntary export restraints, and quality 
restrictions is presented in the Appendix. The implica-
tions of these trade barriers are outlined in this section 
of the report. Readers interested in the technical back-
ground and economic logic behind the propositions pre-
sented here may wish to refer to the Appendix. 
The four trade barriers noted above must be studied 
in terms of both the static and the dynamic effects. The 
static effects of a trade barrier include the impacts on 
domestic and world prices; the quantities produced, con-
sumed, and traded; and producer, consumer, and govern-
ment situations. The dynamic effects concern the way 
in which trade barriers influence price stability through 
time. Frequently, a trade barrier has the static effect of 
increasing producer prices at the same time that it has 
the dynamic effect of contributing to greater price insta-
bility in the world market. Static and dynamic effects 
are outlined for each of the trade barriers discussed. 
Import Tariffs 
An import tariff is a tax applied to imported products 
at the point of entry Tariffs can be set as a fixed amount 
(e.g. , $10 per ton), a percentage of the pre-tariff price 
(known as an ad valorem tariff), or as an amount that 
varies with world market conditions. An example of the 
latter is the variable levy used by the EC The variable 
levy is a tax or tariff set as the difference between the 
world price and a predetermined internal price ~own 
as the threshold price. Unlike per unit and ad valorem 
tariffs, the variable levy can change from day to day. All 
three types of tariffs have the same static effects, but the 
dynamic impacts of the variable levy differ from those 
of the other two. 
The purpose of a tariff is to protect domestic producers 
from the competition of cheaper imported goods. Tariffs 
raise the price of a product in the domestic market. As 
a result, producers receive and consumers pay a higher 
price than they would if no tariff was imposed. Because 
producers receive a higher price, they will normally pro-
duce more goods. Likewise, consumers generally pur-
chase fewer goods at the higher price. The result is that 
the amount of goods the country imports is reduced. If 
the country imposing a tariff is a major importer, the 
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reduction in its imports may represent a significant de-
crease in world demand. If this occurs, it is likely that 
the world price will also be depressed. 
In summary, the static effects of import tariffs are as 
follows: 
• The price in the country levying a tariff increases. 
• At the higher price, producers in that country in-
crease their output while consumers reduce con-
sumption. 
• The amount of goods the country imports declines. 
• The fall in world demand leads to a reduction in 
world trade and lower world prices. 
These changes are to the advantage of producers in 
the country imposing the tariff. They may also benefit 
consumers in the rest of the world who are able to 
purchase at a lower world price. Conversely, producers 
in the rest of the world and consumers in the country 
levying a tariff are hurt by the changes. As shown in the 
Appendix, a tariff also leads to an efficiency loss for the 
world as a whole. This efficiency loss may be partially 
offset by government revenue generated by the tariff. In 
some cases, it may be possible for a government to levy 
an "optimum" tariff which leads to an increase in social 
welfare for that country as compared to its situation 
under free trade. Of course, this increase in social welfare 
is at the expense of the country's trading partners. For 
the world as a whole, an import tariff, or any other kind 
of trade barrier, necessarily reduces global welfare below 
the level attained with free trade. 
Per unit and ad valorem tariffs have a minimal impact 
on price stability. Variations in world prices are transmit-
ted to markets protected by these measures. Consider 
a $10 per unit tariff on a good with a world price of 
$100. A shock to the world market leading to an increase 
of the world price to oS 120, for example, is reflected in 
the protected market in which prices rise from $110 to 
S 130. In addition, shocks within the protected market 
are transmitted to the world market. For example, an 
unusually good harvest leads to lower prices in the pro-
tected market. This, in turn, leads to increased consump-
tion, although the net result is likely to be some decrease 
in imports. The decrease in imports results in a slight 
reduction in world price. The main dynamic effect of an 
ordinary tariff is that it leads to a lower volume of world 
trade than in the free trade case. Markets in which the 
volume of trade is low are sensitive to relatively small 
changes. Thus, in the smaller world market, a fairly small 
shock may cause significant price instability. Within the 
protected market, the greater degree of self-supply re-
duces the vulnerability of the market to shocks transmit-
ted from the world market. 
The variable levy, on the other hand, often contributes 
to much greater price instability Because the variable 
levy is adjusted to reflect world price changes, no vari-
ation in world prices is transmitted to the protected 
market. If the EC threshold price is $140 per unit and 
the world price is $100 per unit, the variable levy is 
$40. If a shock on the world market causes the world 
price to rise to $120, the variable levy is reduced to $20 
per unit and the internal price in the EC remains at the 
predetermined level. In addition, a shock within the EC 
is entirely transmitted to the world market. Because the 
internal price in the EC is ftxed, an unusually good har-
vest does not lead to a price decline within the EC, and 
consumption, therefore, does not change. With the same 
level of demand and a larger supply, the effects of the 
good harvest are entirely absorbed by a reduction in 
imports. Thus, the variable levy insulates the EC from 
any instability that may originate in the world market 
and shifts any internally generated instability onto the 
world market. 
Import Quotas and Voluntary Export 
Restraints 
An import quota is a restriction on the quantity a 
country imports. Import quotas can be designed to have 
the same effect on prices as tariffs. Limiting imports 
brings about a kind of shortage, causing the price in the 
protected market to rise. At the higher price, production 
increases while consumption falls and equilibrium is re-
established between the increased domestic supply, re-
duced domestic demand, and lower quantity of imports. 
A tariff raises the price, leading to a decrease in the 
quantity imported, while a quota limits the quantity im-
ported, leading to a rise in the price. 
The static effects of an import quota are the same as 
those of a tariff. The price in the protected market in-
creases, domestic production increases, and domestic 
consumption decreases. Imports, of course, decline, and 
if the country imposing the quota is a large country, the 
world price will be depressed by the decrease in world 
demand. There is one way, however, in which an import 
quota differs from an import tariff. Recall that an import 
tariff leads to government revenues equal to the per unit 
value of the tariff multiplied by the number of units that 
are still imported. In the case of a quota, an equivalent 
revenue, referred to as a quota rent, is generated (Appen-
dix). The quota rent is equal to the difference between 
the price in the protected market and the depressed 
world price multiplied by the quantity of imports permit-
ted under the quota. 
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Import quotas are normally implemented by providing 
private import fIrms with licenses to import a certain 
quantity The government fIrst must decide the total 
amount of imports that will be allowed. This total quan-
tity is then divided among the import firms, each of 
which is licensed to import a specific amount. These 
importers are able to buy the product at the depressed 
world price and sell it at the higher price in the protected 
market. The proftts from the transactions of all the im-
porters are the quota rents. If the quota is set to raise 
prices by the same amount as a given tariff, the quota 
rent will be equal in value to the government revenue 
generated by the tariff. The difference is that in the case 
described above, the quota rent belongs to the private 
traders granted the right to import, while in the case of 
a tariff, the revenue accrues to the government. 
Of course, an import quota can be implemented in 
other ways. For example, the government could capture 
the quota rents by selling or auctioning the licenses to 
import. The government could also tax the quota rents, 
allowing the importers to keep some portion of this 
revenue. Many possible arrangements can be imagined. 
The important point is that import quotas generate quota 
rents, which may very well be captured in whole or in 
part by private traders. This is in contrast to the tariff 
which generates revenues that belong unequivocally to 
the government, the only authority with the power to 
levy taxes. 
Voluntary export restraints (VERs) are agreements be-
tween an importing country and one or more exporting 
countries. The exporting country "voluntarily" agrees to 
limit the amount shipped to the importing country. The 
agreement to limit exports is usually obtained through 
the implicit or explicit threat of more severe measures 
such as tariffs or quotas. A VER has the same static effects 
as an import quota, including the generation of quota 
rents. The reason for this is that VERs effectively limit 
the amount that an importing country is able to purchase. 
VERs differ from import quotas with respect to the dispo-
sition of the quota rents. In the case of an import quota, 
the rents are retained in the importing country by private 
traders, the government, or some mixture of private and 
government interests. In the case of a VER, however, the 
quota rents belong to government or private interests 
in the exporting country. This is because the exporting 
country is the one regulating the flow of the product. If 
the government of the exporting country grants export 
licenses to private traders, these individuals will be able 
to buy the product at the depressed world price and 
sell it to importers at the higher price in the protected 
market. Thus, the only differences between a VER and 
an import quota are how the trade barrier is administered 
and who receives the quota rents. 
The dynamic effects of import quotas and VERs are 
the same as those occasioned by the variable levy. Quotas 
and VERs regulate the quantities imported. The variable 
levy also determines the quantity imported because in-
ternal prices are not allowed to vary. In all three cases, 
a sudden decrease in world price will not lead to greater 
imports because the quantities are fIxed or world price 
changes are not transmitted to the protected market. 
Likewise, any instability within the protected market is 
fully transferred to the world market. Thus, in compari-
son with ordinary import tariffs - variable levies, import 
quotas, and VERs tend to reduce price variations within 
the protected market and increase price instability in 
the world market. 
Quality Restrictions 
The effects of qUality restrictions are somewhat more 
complex than those of the trade barriers described 
above. Much depends on whether exporting countries 
can comply with the regulation. If producers in some 
or all exporting countries can comply easily with the 
regulation, it may have very little impact on trade. On 
the other hand, producers unable to comply with a qual-
ity restriction will fInd themselves completely excluded 
from the protected market. If some producers can com-
ply while others cannot, quality restrictions may be dis-
criminatory. Trade may be entirely eliminated between 
certain regions at the same time that it continues un-
abated between other regions. In the extreme, the coun-
try introducing a quality restriction may cease to import 
altogether if no producers in other countries are able 
to comply with the restriction. 
Quality restrictions usually lead to higher internal 
prices. In the extreme case in which a country ceases 
to import, internal prices may increase dramatically be-
cause they are determined entirely by domestic supply 
and demand (Appendix). Countries that do not engage 
in foreign trade are in a situation referred to as autarky. 
If all countries were to impose unique and exclusive quality 
requirements, all trade would cease. In this state of gen-
eral autarky, global welfare would decline dramatically. 
In more realistic cases, quality restrictions are likely 
to lead to somewhat higher internal prices, a reduction 
in the choices available to consumers, and a reduction 
in imports. These effects are similar to those of import 
quotas, and the extent to which the quality restriction 
reduces the volume of trade determines the degree to 
which these consequences are realized. One difference 
between quality restrictions and other types of trade 
barriers is that they do not generate revenue or quota 
rent. It is not possible to buy a lower priced product 
that does not meet the quality standard and sell it for 
the higher price in the market in which the standard is 
applied. 
Another way quality regulations differ from the con-
ventional trade barriers is that they are often motivated 
by honest health, safety, or quality concerns. If this is 
the case, consumers may be willing to pay the higher 
price in order to obtain products that meet the higher 
standards. Of course, there are many cases in which the 
market is able to account for quality variation without 
a government regulation. Discounts for high moisture 
content in grain is an example of price adjustments based 
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on quality criteria. However, if the market fails to take 
quality differences into consideration, consumers may 
be better off with a government regulation that causes 
prices to increase and limits the range of products avail-
able. This would be the case if the regulation protects 
consumers from unsafe or harmful products. 
The dynamic effects of quality restrictions depend on 
the specifIc situation. If a quality restriction adopted in 
one country causes that country to stop importing alto-
gether, there may be increased instability within the 
country. Although world market instability cannot be 
transmitted to the internal market of the autarkic coun-
try, any shocks within that country must be absorbed by 
this internal market. In other words, an autarkic country 
cannot shift any of its internal instability to the world 
market. If quality restrictions reduce the number of coun-
tries participating in world trade, the world market will 
be smaller and more vulnerable to destabilizing shocks. 
Thus, quality restrictions may lead to increased instabil-
ity in both the internal and world markets. These effects 
will be mitigated if the regulation interferes only slightly 
with international trade flows. 
In summary, quality restrictions are likely to have the 
following effects: 
• They will lead to higher prices in the country imple-
menting the regulation and may depress the world 
price. 
• Domestic producers will receive a higher price but 
their costs of production are likely to increase as 
well since they must comply with the regulation. 
• Domestic consumers must pay higher prices and 
the choices available to them are reduced. 
• Producers who exported to the country implement-
ing a quality restriction will fInd themselves exclud-
ed entirely from that country's market if they cannot 
comply. Quality restrictions may, therefore, be selec-
tive and discriminatory. 
• In some cases, quality restrictions can lead to greater 
instability in both the domestic and world markets. 
If the objective is to protect domestic producers from 
foreign competition, quality regulations are the least de-
sirable way to achieve this goal. For the country imposing 
quality restrictions, no quota rents are generated, the 
choices available to consumers are reduced, the higher 
prices received by producers may be offset by higher 
costs of production, and the regulation may exacerbate 
domestic instability. For other countries, these regula-
tions may be discriminatory and have the potential for 
dramatically reducing the volume of trade. The result 
will be increased instability in the world market and 
larger efficiency losses (Appendix). The adverse eco-
nomic effects of quality restrictions may be acceptable 
if the true motivation is to correct a market failure that 
would threaten the health and safety of individuals or 
livestock, or harm the environment. On the other hand, 
better methods of protecting domestic producers from 
foreign competition can be implemented. 
III. The EC Hormone Ban and the Market for Edible Offals 
On December 31, 1985, the EC adopted a directive 
prohibiting the use of hormonal growth promotants in 
livestock production (European Community, Dec. 31, 
1985). This directive includes provision to block imports 
of livestock products from animals to which the banned 
hormonal substances have been administered. The US. 
has challenged the EC ban before GATT officials arguing 
that the EC legislation is, in reality, a trade barrier (Inside 
US. Trade, May 29, 1987). Meat producers in the US. 
and Australia claim that there is little scientific evidence 
of adverse effects from consuming meat from hormone-
treated animals (Agra Europe, January 17, 1986; De-
cember 5, 1986). Within the EC itself, the United King-
dom and Denmark are opposed to the hormone ban and 
have taken steps to block its implementation (Agra 
Europe, May 8, 1987). European consumer groups, how-
ever, are pressing for implementation of the ban as sched-
uled (Agra Europe, December 5, 1986). The ban was to 
have gone into effect on January 1, 1988, but its im-
plementation was delayed for one year in response to 
foreign opposition (Agra Europe, November 20, 1987). 
The purpose of this section of the report is to analyze 
the economic consequences of the EC hormone ban. No 
attempt will be made to judge the legitimacy of the 
competing claims concerning the harmful health effects 
of livestock growth promotants. The analysis will focus 
on the economic consequences of the ban for a particular 
market. The specific case chosen for study is the market 
for edible offals. This example was chosen because edible 
offals are an important US. export to the EC. 
Ee Policy and the Market for Edible Offals 
Hormones are used extensively as growth promotants 
in livestock production. They lead to improved feed con-
version and faster, more uniform growth rates, thus re-
ducing the costs of production. Growth promotants are 
usually administered through implants or injections. The 
EC has offered some concessions in the conflict over 
the hormone ban, including limited hormone use ad-
ministered though injections. US. livestock producers 
have rejected this offer because the most common treat-
ment method in the United States is to use ear implants 
(Inside US. Trade, May 29, 1987). This issue concerns 
residues that may remain in the meat depending on the 
method of administering the hormones and the timing 
of the treatment. In 1981, the EC adopted legislation 
prohibiting the use of certain kinds of hormones follow-
ing discovery of the hormone DES (a known carcinogen) 
in Italian baby food (European Community, November 
6,1981). This was followed by the 1985 ban on all sexual 
hormones. 
Agricultural policy in the EC includes a great many 
measures to protect internal markets. Tariffs, variable 
levies, export subsidies, and various input subsidies and 
production aids are used to protect livestock product 
producers. In recent years, EC livestock production has 
generally been greater than consumption, and the EC 
has become an important exporter of milk products, 
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beef, and veal. Prior to 1968 and the implementation of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Western Europe 
was the largest beef deficit area in the world (Simpson 
and Farris). Currently, the EC is self-sufficient in pork 
and pOUltry but imports substantial quantities of sheep-
meat, high-quality beef, and edible offals. Because the 
support prices for most livestock products are above the 
world price, any exports must be subsidized. The hor-
mone ban may lead to higher production costs and, ulti-
mately, higher internal prices in the EC. The effect of 
such a change would be to increase the size of the export 
subsidies needed to continue exporting the surplus. 
Thus, a potential consequence of the ban may be to 
worsen the already tight agricultural budget. This effect 
would be lessened if the EC is able to promote its meat 
exports as hormone-free and charge a premium on 
foreign markets. 
Edible offals include livers, brains, kidneys, sweet-
breads, tripe, and tongues from cattle and hogs. They 
are by-products of less value than the meat for which 
the animals are primarily produced. Because edible offals 
are by-products, supply is largely determined by the 
number of animals slaughtered for meat. Thus, the supply 
of edible offals can generally be calculated as a f1Xed 
proportion of total meat supplies. Consumption of edible 
offals in the EC is relatively high. This is particularly true 
in France and Ireland where per capita consumption is 
about twice the average for countries belonging to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD, 1984). Because of the high consumption 
rate and the fact that the amount of edible offals per 
animal slaughtered is f1Xed, the EC must import signifi-
cant quantities. More than half the edible offals con-
sumed in France are imported, and they constitute 15 
percent of the meat consumed annually in France (Ross). 
The EC imports about 200,000 metric tons of edible 
offals each year and the US. is a major source of these 
imports. In 1986, US. exports to the EC amounted to 
90,000 metric tons of edible offals worth some $107 
million (US. Meat Export Federation, April 14, 1987). 
Other suppliers to the EC include Argentina, Brazil, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand. For most livestock products, 
the EC applies extensive trade barriers. For edible offals, 
however, the only measure used is a tariff of 7 percent 
for livers and 4 percent for other edible offals (Agra 
Europe, Ltd., 1986). The hormone ban is an additional 
trade barrier that may have a Significant impact on the 
edible offal market. 
Implications of the Hormone Ban 
for Edible Offals 
A model of the world market for edible offals is illus-
trated in Figure 1. The world is divided into three regions: 
exporting countries, the Ee, and non-EC importing coun-
tries. Because offals are by-products of meat production, 
marketed supplies depend more on conditions in meat 
markets than on edible offal prices. The supply schedules 
for all regions are therefore shown as perfectly inelastic. 
P P ES P P 
PEC 
Pw Pw Pw ~----~~--~---------+--~~~---------------+--------~~~~----+-------~~ 
P' w 
'---~'+-----'---Q 
QDl' QD' 
x x 
Panel a 
Exporting 
Countries 
Figure 1. World Market for Edible Offals. 
Panelb 
World 
Market 
Excess supply and demand schedules are derived as the 
difference between supply and demand in the three re-
gions. The excess demand schedules for the two import-
ing regions are added horizontally in the world trade 
quadrant to give EDT' The intersection of ES and EDT 
determines the initial world price, P W ' 
For the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that all 
exporting countries use hormones and that it would be 
very costly to change this practice. Thus, when the EC 
hormone ban goes into effect, the EC will cease import-
ing edible offals. Trade will continue among the other 
importing countries and exporting countries. The situa-
tion is assumed to be similar to the first quality restriction 
case described in the Appendix. In fact, this is an extreme 
case and the estimated effects should be seen as upper 
limits. With these assumptions, the EC will be in autarky 
after implementing the hormone ban. The price in the 
EC will rise from P w to PEC ' Producer surplus increases 
by area "A' while consumer surplus falls by area '~ + B." 
(See Appendix for definitions of producer and consumer 
surplus.) Area "B" represents the net loss to the EC of 
the hormone ban. In the world market, removal of the 
EC excess demand leaves the excess demand schedule 
labeled EDR . This is the excess demand from non-EC 
countries. A new equilibrium is established at a lower 
world price, P ~, and a smaller quantity traded, Q~. The 
fall in world price is dampened somewhat because other 
importing nations may increase purchases at the lower 
price. For the exporting countries, a smaller quantity is 
exported at a lower price. 
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The relationships described above were estimated 
econometrically using annual data from 1972 to 1984. 
The data include the quantities produced, consumed, 
and imported in nine EC countries (Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal are excluded). In addition, data on the supply 
of edible offals to the world market and an estimate of 
world price obtained by dividing the dollar value of 
world trade by the quantities traded are used (U.S. Meat 
Export Federation, April 18, 1986). The EC price was 
obtained by using real exchange rates to translate the 
world price into an EC price and adjusting this price to 
reflect the tariff. Other variables used include world and 
EC income (OECD, 1986). The quantity variables were 
obtained from Foreign Agriculture Service (USDA) or 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) publications. 
To measure the effects of the hormone ban in the -EC, 
it is necessary to estimate a demand equation. The as-
sumption of perfectly inelastic supply was tested and 
not rejected (Peterson, Paggi, and Henry). The system 
is assumed to be recursive with predetermined supplies. 
These assumptions mean that the logical specification 
of the demand relationship is with price as the dependent 
variable. This specification allows direct estimation of 
the price flexibility of demand. A price flexibility meas-
ures the percentage change in a price for a given percen-
tage change in quantity. For this analysis, knowledge of 
the price flexibility allows estimation of the change in 
EC prices when imports are eliminated and the quantity 
supplied and consumed is determined entirely by EC 
production. 
The estimated price-dependent demand relationship 
is shown below in Equation 1. (Throughout the report, 
the figures shown in parentheses are standard errors.) 
1. ECUPR = 5595.46 - 814.72 CONS + 0.067 RLY 
(1805.23) (348.10) (0.039) 
R2 =.55 
Where: 
first order rho = .539 
ECUPR = EC price of edible offals in European 
Currency Units per metric ton (ECU/MT) 
CONS = per capita consumption of edible offals (kg) 
RLY = real per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GOP) in ECU 
This equation has been corrected for first order auto 
correlation. Although the adjusted R2 is fairly low, the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are significantly 
different from zero and of the expected sign. The price 
flexibility derived from this equation is - 3.21. Alterna-
tive specifications generally gave flexibility estimates be-
tween - 2.80 and - 3.60. 
By limiting the quantity available in the EC, the hor-
mone ban will lead to an increase in price (to PEC in 
Figure 1) and changes in producer and consumer 
surplus. To measure these effects, it is necessary to know 
the price flexibility, EC production of edible offals, EC 
imports of edible offals, and the initial price. Subtracting 
imports from total consumption gives the change in 
quantity in the EC. The percentage change in quantity 
multiplied by the flexibility gives the percentage change 
in EC price. This allows an estimate of PEC to be made 
and also makes it possible to estimate areas "A' and "B" 
in Figure 1 with some simple geometry. To provide a 
range in the estimates, flexibilities of - 2.80, - 3.21, 
- 3.60 were used. The average values of the other vari-
ables for the period 1980-1984 were used in the compu-
tations. The results are shown in Table 1. 
Elimination of imports in the EC would lead to a de-
cline in consumption of about 12 percent and an increase 
in market prices of some 34 percent to 45 percent. At 
the higher price, producer surplus increases by between 
720 million ECU and 925 million ECU The ECU (Euro-
pean Currency Unit) is a basket of EC currencies that is 
usually fairly close to the US. dollar in value. The analysis 
has been conducted in real terms, that is, after monetary 
values are corrected for inflation. The maximum gain 
for EC edible offal producers is, thus, le~s than one billion 
real (1980) ECU The fall in consumer surplus is larger 
than the increase in producer surplus, leading to a net 
loss for the EC. However, this efficiency loss is fairly 
small compared to the magnitude of producer gains. 
Real world price depends on both excess supply and 
excess demand. A two-equation excess supply and excess 
demand model was estimated but the results could not 
be used for this analysis (Peterson, Paggi, and Henry). 
The two-equation model did, however, provide useful 
information in choosing the variables included in Equa-
tion 2. World per capita pOUltry consumption and the 
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time trend are supply shifters while income (real GDP) 
is a demand shifter. These variables, along with the vol-
ume of world edible offal trade, explain much of the 
variation in real world offal price. 
:~ 
Table 1. Welfare Effects of Hormone Ban in EC 
(in millions of 1980 ECU) 
Flexibility 
Measure -2.80 -3.21 
Change in producer surplus (P) 719.7 825.0 
Change in consumer surplus (C) -769.6 -882.3 
Net welfare change in EC (P+C) -49.9 -57.3 
-3.60 
925.3 
-989.6 
-64.3 
A constant elasticity, price dependent equation was 
estimated for the world market. 
2. Log RWP = -42.525 + 1.289 log VT + 4.061 log WGDP 
(19.36) (0.755) (2.525) 
-2.227 log T + 1.870 log PCP 
R2 = .81 
Where: 
(0.616) (1.177) 
first order rho = 0.588 
RWP = real world price (S/MT) 
T = time trend 
VT = world edible offal trade (MT) 
PCP = world per capita poultry consumption (kg) 
WGDP = real GOP of OECD countries (S) 
log = natural logarithms 
Equation 2 can be used to obtain an estimate of the 
decrease in real world price resulting from EC with-
drawal from the world market. The average volume of 
world trade during 1980-1984 was about 700,000 metric 
tons, of which 200,000 were imported by the EC. Setting 
the quantity variable (VT) at 500,000 using 1980-1984 
average values for the other variables, and solving Equa-
tion 2, provides an estimate of the decrease in world 
price. The results indicate that the real world price would 
decrease almost 35 percent after the hormone ban hold-
ing all else constant. In combination with the lower quan-
tity traded, the total value of world edible offal trade 
could shrink from a 1980-1984 average, in nominal dol-
lars, of more than S 1 billion to $ 504 million. 
It should be emphasized that these results are upper-
limit estimates. Changes in imports by non-EC importing 
countries have not been taken into account. These im-
ports can be expected to increase, dampening the impact 
of the EC ban. In addition, these results are based on 
the assumption that the EC ceases all imports. If some 
countries are able to comply with the EC regulation with 
no cost involved, or if some exporting countries do not 
use hormones, the decrease in EC imports may be less 
pronounced and the impact on world prices less severe. 
Also, negotiations on the implementation method of the 
hormone ban may result in its dilution, thereby diminish-
ing the impact of the EC regulation. Nevertheless, the 
results show that removal of the large part of world 
demand presently accounted for by the EC would lead 
to a fairly large decrease in the world price of edible 
offals. If the price is depressed sufficiently, many produc-
ers may find that exporting edible offals is no longer 
profitable. 
Iv. Conclusion 
The example described in the previous section illus-
trates the way in which qUality restrictions can affect 
world and internal markets. The results of the analysis 
indicate that the hormone ban will lead to an increase 
in EC edible offal prices of some 34 percent to 45 per-
cent, while the world price could fall by as much as 35 
percent. Within the EC, the net welfare loss is relatively 
small compared to the increase in producer surplus. The 
actual effects of the hormone ban would probably be 
much less severe because some producers may be able 
to comply with the regulation so that EC imports would 
not stop altogether. Also, if other importing nations re-
spond to the lower world price by increasing their pur-
chases of edible offals, the impact of the ban would be 
mitigated. 
Despite these qualifications, it appears that the EC 
hormone ban may substantially disrupt the world market 
for edible offals. In this situation, an interesting question 
concerns the response of producers in exporting coun-
tires. The U S. beef industry estimates that compliance 
with the ban would result in the loss of about 5314 
million of domestic production, almost three times the 
value of U S. beef and veal exports to the EC (US. Meat 
Export Federation, April 14, 1987). On the other hand, 
some producers may find that they can increase their 
returns by producing hormone-free beef and edible offals 
to take advantage of the higher prices in the EC. Whether 
this kind of response is possible depends in part on the 
certification and inspection procedures that the EC re-
quires. It is not inconceivable for the EC to set up certifi-
cation requirements that are so cumbersome that any 
potential for specializaion to take advantage of the EC 
price would be eliminated. 
For the EC, an essential question concerns the impli-
cations of the ban for beef exports. Higher prices in the 
EC may increase budget problems because export sub-
sidies may have to be iflcreased. On the other hand, it 
is possible that a premium for hormone-free beef could 
be charged, offsetting, at least partially, the need for in-
creased subsidies. It also should be noted that no com-
pletely effective n).ethod has been developed for detect-
ing hormones in meat. In fact, a thriving black market 
trade exists for hormones that have been illegal for many 
years in countries such as Germany and The Netherlands. 
These circumstances may preclude charging a premium 
for hormone-free beef and raise interesting questions 
concerning how the EC will enforce the ban, both inter-
nally and with respect to imported meat. Another issue 
concerns the likelihood that other countries will adopt 
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similar legislation. If Japan established a hormone ban, 
it could have a dramatic impact on world trade in beef. 
US. consumer groups may also elect to follow the exam-
ple of their European counterparts in eliminating the 
use of hormones in livestock production. The extent to 
which countries adopt regulations of this nature and the 
way in which the regulations are implemented will have 
important consequences for world trade. 
Because food and agricultural markets are highly in-
terdependent today, qUality restrictions adopted in one 
region are likely to affect producers and consumers in 
other regions. The reason for this widespread effect is 
that domestic measures must also be applied to imports 
if the good is traded. In many, perhaps most, cases the 
motivation for establishing quality regulations is the be-
lief that the market will fail to account for health or 
safety hazards, or other quality components believed to 
be important. However, many situations occur in which 
the quality regulation is perceived by at least some of 
the market participants as a trade barrier. If elimina-
tion of conventional agricultural trade barriers leads to 
great reliance on quality restrictions to protect domestic 
producers, there may be a proliferation of regulations 
that have little to do with legitimate health and safety 
concerns. 
This type of outcome may be worse than the current 
situation. The conventional trade barriers presently in 
use may be less disruptive than quality restrictions de-
signed as an alternative protectionist device. For the 
importing country, a tariff or import quota has the advan-
tage of generating government revenue or quota rents 
that may offset the efficiency losses to some extent. This 
is not the case with quality restrictions. For the world 
as a whole, the efficiency losses may be greater with 
quality restrictions because they eliminate trade be-
tween countries with different regulatory regimes al-
together. In general, using quality regulations to protect 
domestic producers from foreign competition is the least 
desirable way to accomplish protectionist objectives. 
This points back to the problem of distinguishing be-
tween quality restrictions that are based on legitimate 
concerns from those that are simply methods to elimi-
nate foreign competition. To make such a determina-
tion requires more than scientific evidence. The eco-
nomic, political, legal, social, and cultural aspects of the 
issue may be as important as any laboratory evidence 
presented. The political economy of quality restrictions 
in international trade is an important area for further 
research. 
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APPENDIX 
The Impacts of Alternative Trade Barriers 
Trade barriers affect prices; quantities supplied, de-
manded, and traded; government budgets; and the well-
being of producers and consumers. The way in which 
these variables are affected depends on the nature of the 
trade barrier. The purpose of this appendix is to detail 
the impacts of four common types of trade barriers: 
Import tariffs, import quotas, voluntary export restraints, 
and quality restrictions. Each type of barrier is analyzed 
using graphs and the concepts of consumer and producer 
surplus. Producer surplus is defined as the area above 
the supply curve and below the prevailing price. Con-
sumer surplus is defined as the area below the demand 
curve and above the prevailing price. These concepts 
are illustrated in Figure Al. 
In Panel a. of Figure Al, consumers are able to purchase 
the product at the world price (Pw). Consumer surplus 
is represented by the hashed area labeled '1\.." If price 
was at P2 , there would be some consumers still willing 
to buy the product. These consumers benefit from being 
able to purchase the good at the lower P w. Consumer 
surplus measures the total benefits to consumers of being 
able to purchase at P w rather than at higher prices. The 
small hashed area "B" is producer surplus. It measures 
the benefit to producers of being able to sell at P wrather 
than at lower prices. In Panel b. of Figure Al, the world 
price has changed from P w to P~. This increase in the 
world price leads to a reduction in consumer surplus. 
Because consumers now must purchase at P ~ instead of 
P w, total consumer surplus has declined by the area 
'1\.+B+C+O." Producers, on the other hand, benefit from 
the higher price. In terms of producer surplus, they have 
P 
S 
P 
2 
P 
w~=----I 
P ~--------~---------Q as aD 
a. Total Producer and 
Consumer Surplus 
Figure Al. Producer and Consumer Surplus. 
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gained area '1\.." Producer and consumer surplus are use-
ful concepts for evaluating the impact of trade policies 
on the well-being of producers and consumers, and are 
used in the following discussion. 
Import Tariffs 
The first type of trade barrier to be examined is the 
import tariff. In Figure A2, a three-quadrant graph of a 
world market is used to show the equilibrium prices 
and quantities in the absence of trade barriers. The differ-
ence in supply and demand in the importing region is 
used to derive an excess demand schedule (ED). This 
excess demand schedule, shown in the world trade quad-
rant, indicates the quantities imported at different world 
prices. The excess supply schedule (ES) for exporting 
countries is derived in the same manner. The equilibrium 
world price is established at P w where excess supply 
equals excess demand. Note that QT = QDM - QSM = 
QSx - QDx· 
If an import tariff is applied to the product being traded 
in Figure A2, it will raise the price in the market of the 
importing countries. This is shown in Figure A3. A tariff 
is a tax on imported goods. Tariffs can be levied on an 
ad valorem, per unit, or variable basis. The effect of the 
tariff is to raise the price in the importing countries from 
P w to Pro At the higher price, consumers in the importing 
countries purchase less, and producers in the importing 
countries increase supplies to the market. Consequently, 
the importing countries import less of the product. In 
effect, the excess demand schedule shifts from EDo to 
ED 1> causing world price to fall to P~. The fall in world 
P' 
w 
P 
P w 1----#---'----+---..---
~~~--_P~----------Q 
b. Changes in Producer 
and Consumer Surplus 
price occurs because the situation represented in Figure 
A3 is that of a major importing country. A tariff applied 
in a small importing country may have an imperceptible 
effect on world price if the country purchases very small 
amounts in relation to the volume of world trade. 
In the case of a large importing country, the reduction 
in demand for imports will depress the world price. 
Importers in these countries now purchase the product 
on the world market at P~, pay a tax equal to the differ-
ence between PT and P~, and sell the product on the 
market of the importing countries at Pl' This change 
means that consumer surplus in the importing countries 
is reduced by area '~+B+C+E." Producers gain area ''A' 
P S P 
which is transferred from consumers. The small triangles 
"B" and "E" represent efficiency losses due to the distor-
tion introduced by the tariff. Area "c+o" is the govern-
ment revenue from the tariff. The overall effect for the 
importing countries can be determin,ed by adding the 
gains and losses. The loss in consumer surplus 
(A+B+C+E) can be subtracted from the producer gains 
(A) and government revenue (c+o). The net effect is 
area "O-B-E." If area "0" is bigger than areas "B+E," 
there is a net gain for the importing countries. 
In the exporting countries, consumers benefit from 
the depressed world price, but there is a loss in producer 
surplus. In Figure A3, consumers in the exporting coun-
P 
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World Trade Quadrant 
QDx QSx 
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Figure A2. Equilibrium World Price and Quantity Trade in the Absence of Barriers to Trade. 
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Figure A3. The Effects of Trade Barriers. 
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tries gain area "L +M" while producers lose area 
"L +M+N+O+P." Thus, there is a net loss to the exporting 
countries equal to area "N+O+P." Area "0" is transferred 
from the exporting countries to the importing countries 
where it appears as area "D." For the world as a whole, 
there are four small triangles-B, E, N, and p-which 
represent the efficiency loss due to the imposition of 
the tariff. 
In summary, the introduction of an import tariff raises 
prices in the importing countries and depresses the 
world price received by exporters. The tariff benefits 
producers in importing countries and consumers in ex-
porting countries. Producers in exporting countries and 
consumers in importing countries are hurt by the tariff 
and there is an efficiency loss for the world as a whole. 
Finally, the government in the importing country obtains 
revenue from the tariff. 
Import Quotas 
An import quota limits the quantity allowed on the 
market. The effect of a quota is also a price increase, but 
the direction of causality is reversed compared to import 
tariffs. The tariff raises price, leading to a decrease in the 
quantity imported. A quota limits the quantity imported, 
leading to an increase in price. A quota can be designed 
to have the same effect on prices as a tariff. In Figure 
A3, an import quota set equal to the difference between 
QD~ and QS~ will cause the market price to rise to Pl' 
A quota of this nature would effect producer and con-
sumer surpluses, quantities traded, and prices the same 
as the tariff described above. 
An import quota differs from a tariff in one way. Recall 
that area "C+D" in Figure A3 represents government 
revenue from the tariff. A quota will result in the same 
potential revenue, generally referred to as a quota rent. 
Normally, an import quota is implemented by granting 
import licenses to private individuals. These individuals 
have the right to import a certain quantity, and the sum 
of all individual import rights is equal to the total amount 
allowed by the quota. An individual granted a license to 
import a certain quantity can purchase that amount at 
the depressed world price P ~ and sell it at PT in the 
importing country. Under these circumstances, the quota 
rents, which are equal in value to the tariff revenue, 
belong to the private individuals who have the license 
to import. 
There are other ways of implementing an import quota 
as well. The government could sell or auction the licenses 
to import, for example. In this case, private importers 
would purchase the right to import from the government 
and the government would be able to capture the quota 
rent. Another way to set up an import quota would be 
to establish a state monopoly on imports of the good in 
question. A state agency established as the only legal 
importer could buy the entire quota on the world market 
at P~, sell it in the country at PT, and retain the quota 
rent as government revenue. It would also be possible 
for the quota rent to be shared in some fashion between 
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the government and private traders. For example, import 
licenses could be sold at a price that would only recover 
some portion of the quota rent, rather than the entire 
amount. 
In summary, an import quota leads to the following 
changes: 
• Prices in the importing country increase. 
• World prices and prices in exporting countries 
decrease. 
• Producer surplus in the importing country and con-
sumer surplus in the exporting country increase. 
• Consumer surplus in the importing country and pro-
ducer surplus in the exporting country decrease. 
• There is a net efficiency loss for the world as a whole. 
These effects are the same as those occasioned by an 
import tariff. The main difference between import quotas 
and import tariffs concerns the disposition of area "C+D" 
in Figure A3. In the case of a tariff, this area is government 
revenue. In the case of a quota, it is a quota rent which 
may be shared in anyone of a number of ways between 
the government and private traders. 
Voluntary Export Restraints 
Voluntary export restraints (VERs) are similar to im-
port quotas in that they regulate the quantity placed on 
the market. VERs are agreements negotiated between an 
importing country and one or more exporting countries. 
The exporting countries agree to limit their exports to 
some predetermined quantity This type of restriction 
has the same effects in the importing and exporting coun-
tries as an import quota. The difference, again, concerns 
who will receive the quota rents represented by area 
"C+D" in Figure A3. Because the exporting countries 
"voluntarily" agree to limit exports, it is up to them to 
grant export licenses to control the amount exported. 
The result is that the quota rents in Figure A3 are trans-
ferred to the exporting country. As with import quotas, 
the government of the exporting country can simply 
grant the right to export to private individuals, or it can 
sell or auction the right, allocate it to a state monopoly, 
or tax it. 
Thus, in the case of a VER, quota rents are retained in 
one form or another in the exporting country. This is 
presumably one of the main reasons exporting countries 
agree to these arrangements. The usual sequence of 
events is that economic conditions in an importing coun-
try generate political pressures to protect domestic pro-
ducers. The government then suggests that it will have 
to introduce quotas or tariffs unless the countries supply-
ing the home market "voluntarily" agree to reduce their 
exports. From the point of view of the exporting country, 
a voluntary agreement is preferable to quotas or tariffs 
because the quota rent generated by a VER is retained 
in the exporting country 
An illustration of the value of these quota rents is 
provided by Wonnacott and Wonnacott. In Hong Kong, 
private exporters have been granted the right to sell 
certain quantities of textiles in the United States. The 
quota rent associated with this right is substantial and a 
market has developed in which these export quotas are 
traded. An individual who owns an export quota can sell 
or lease it to someone who actually produces and exports 
the good. "Some Hong Kong exporters with large quotas 
found that it was more profitable to sell the quota rights 
than to produce the goods. So they closed down their 
factories and lived off the proceeds from the sale of their 
quotas" (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, p. 656). 
Quality Regulations 
QUality regulations differ from the trade barriers de-
scribed above in several respects. First, they do not neces-
sarily have the same effect on imports from all sources. 
Producers in some countries may be able to continue 
exporting to a country implementing a qualitative restric-
tion if there are similar regulations in their country, or 
if they can easily comply with the regulation of the im-
porting country. On the other hand, producers who are 
unable to comply with a regulation will effectively be 
excluded from the market-their exports will fall to 
zero. Thus, quality regulations on internationally traded 
goods may be discriminatory, eliminating all trade be-
tween certain regions, while allowing trade to continue 
as if no barrier between other regions existed. 
QUality regulations generally lead to higher internal 
prices because domestic producers must also comply 
with the regulation. Although producers will receive 
higher prices, they are also likely to experience higher 
costs of production as a result of c'omplying with the 
regulation. Imports by the country implementing a qual-
ity regulation may decline if few suppliers are able to 
comply. In the extreme, imports will be entirely elimi-
nated if no producers in the exporting countries are able 
p 
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to comply with the regulation. This extreme situation is 
depicted in Figure A4. Assume that no producers in the 
exporting countries are in compliance with a regulation 
implemented in the importing countries and that they 
are unable to alter their practices to ¢,omply with the 
rule, at least in the short-term. Under these circum 
stances, all trade of the product will cease and the two 
markets will be in the situation referred to as autarky. 
Prices will be determined entirely by domestic supply 
and demand. For the importing countries, this is shown 
as an increase from P w to PAin Figure A 4. Producer sur-
plus increases by area ''A,'' consumer surplus decreas-
es by area ''A +B," and society experiences a net loss of 
area "B." 
In the exporting countries, price falls from P w to PN . 
Consumer surplus increases by area "e," producer 
surplus decreases by area "e+o," and society experi-
ences a net loss of area "D." For the world as a whole, 
areas "B" and "0" represent the efficiency losses due to 
the elimination of trade. The global efficiency loss repre-
sents the maximum loss to the world economy. If some 
producers can comply with the regulation, or if only 
some of the importing countries adopt the restriction, 
some trade would continue and the impact on prices 
and quantities would be less severe. 
Consider a world made up offour regions or countries, 
two of which are net exporters of the product, while 
the other two are net importers. Excess supply (ES) 
schedules can be derived for the two exporting countries 
and excess demand (ED) can be derived for the import-
ing countries. These schedules can be added horizontally 
to determine the aggregate ES and ED schedules. The 
procedure is illustrated in Figure A5. The individual ex-
cess supply and excess demand curves are aggregated 
to form the kinked schedules ES1+ 2 and ED3+ 4. The 
intersection of these schedules determines a world price 
p 
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Figure A4. The Effects of Eliminating Trade. 
16 
p p p 
S 
......:.------Q -------Q QT 
Region 1 Region 2 Trade Quadrant Region 3 Region 4 
FigureA5. Equilibrium in a Four-Region TradeModel. 
and the quantities traded by each region, assuming no 
trade barriers are in effect. 
As in Figure A4, quality restrictions that lead to a 
cessation of all trade would result in autarky, in which 
supply and demand in each region would determine 
prices and quantities. In the more complex situation 
shown in Figure A5, there would be four prices corre-
sponding to the four intersections of supply and demand 
schedules in the four regions. 
In Figure AG, the world trade quadrant from Figure 
A5 is reproduced in order to further analyze the implica-
tions of quality restrictions. In the absence of trade bar-
riers, world price is P w and quantity QT is exchanged. 
Consider the three following situations: 
1. Region 4 implements a quality restriction with which 
it is impossible for anyone in Regions 1 or 2 to comply. 
Region 3 does not have any qUality restrictions. 
2. Regions 3 and 4 both implement a quality restriction 
with which Region 1 is unable to comply but with 
which Region 2 can comply. 
3. Region 4 implements a quality restriction with which 
Region 2 can comply. Region 1 is unable to comply 
with the regulation, which is not enforced in Region 3. 
Other combinations could be imagined, but these are 
the most useful cases for tracing the implications of qual-
ity restrictions. Each will be examined respectively. 
In the first case, the regulation exists only in Region 
4. Region 3 does not apply the regulation and the two 
exporting regions cannot comply with it. The result is 
that Region 4 will drop out of the market and move to 
a state of autarky, while trade among the three remaining 
regions will continue. The equilibrium will occur where 
~Sl+2 = ED3 in Figure AG. World price declines from 
Pw to PA, while the;quantity traded falls from QT to QA' 
Consumers (producers) in Region 3 stand to gain (lose) 
from this change while producers (consumers) in Reg-
ions 1 and 2 stand to lose (gain) from it. In Region 4, 
the changes in producer and consumer surpluses are the 
same as those illustrated in Figure A4 since the region 
essentially enters a state of autarky. 
In the second case, Region 2 is able to comply with 
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a regulation implemented in both importing regions but 
Region 1 cannot. In this scenario, trade can continue 
among regions 2 , 3, and 4, but Region 1 is excluded 
from the world market. Equilibrium is now established 
where the Region 2 excess supply schedule (ES2) inter-
sects the total excess demand (ED3+4) . Because total 
demand has not changed and one of the suppliers to the 
world market is excluded, world price rises to Pa. The 
quantity traded is less than the case in which no regula-
tions are in place (QT)' In this situation, producers in 
regions 2, 3, and 4 benefit while consumers in those 
regions must pay a higher price. The changes in con-
sumer and producer surplus in Region 1 are the same 
as those shown in Figure A4 for an exporting country 
forced into autarky. 
The third case is somewhat more complicated. Region 
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Figure A6. The Effects of Quality Regulations. 
4 implements a regulation with which Region 2 can 
comply. The regulation is not applied in Region 3 and 
producers in Region 1 are unable to comply with the 
regulation in Region 4. It is certain that trade between 
Regions 1 and 4 will be eliminated. Region 4 will trade 
with Region 2 while Region 3 can purchase from either 
of the exporting regions. To keep the graph from becom-
ing unduly complicated, no attempt is made to illustrate 
this case in Figure A6. The most likely outcome is that 
Region 4 will purchase an amount determined by ES2 
and ED 4 from Region 2 at a price determined by the 
intersection of these schedules. The rest of world de-
mand will be satisfied primarily by Region 1, but depend-
ing on the location of ED3, Region 3 may also purchase 
from Region 2. The implications of this situation for 
the change in prices and quantities are somewhat 
ambiguous. 
In general, the impacts of quality regulations are more 
complicated than those of more conventional trade bar-
riers. Frequently, this type of barrier is applied selectively. 
Countries already complying with the regulation or able 
to comply without cost can continue trading with the 
regulating country. Countries unable to comply are com-
pletely excluded from the market in question. The quan-
tity of imports by an importing country implementing 
a quality restriction may not change significantly if many 
countries already have a similar regulation. In this situa-
tion, however, it is likely that the source of these imports 
will be altered. On the other hand, some regulations may 
move an importing country to an autarkic position, and 
if this country is large, the impact on world prices and 
trade could be substantial. An example of this situation 
is discussed in Part III of the report. 
Because quality restrictions essentially "prevent" cer-
tain exchanges, they do not generate quota rents. It is 
not possible to purchase lower cost products not in 
compliance with a regulation on the world market and 
sell them for a higher price in a regulated market. This 
is an important difference from the more conventional 
barriers. It is possible, however, to question the rele-
vance of the standard measures of producer and con-
sumer welfare. After all, the loss in consumer surplus 
resulting from higher prices in a regulated market may 
be offset by the gain in consumer well-being brought 
about by the assurance.of safer or better quality products. 
The issue is whether the restriction is truly needed to 
overcome some type of market failure, or whether it is 
simply a way to protect domestic producers from foreign 
competition. 
Further Considerations on Trade Barriers 
Up to this point, the discussion of the different barriers 
to trade has been conducted in terms of the static effects 
on prices and quantities. There is an important dynamiC 
component, however, which must also be considered. 
The different trade restrictions have different impacts 
on the evolution of prices through time. If the internal 
market of an importing country is perfectly isolated from 
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the world market, variations in world prices are not 
transmitted to that country's market. In addition, instabil-
ity within countries with perfectly isolated domestic mar-
kets is shifted to the world market rather than absorbed 
internally. 
An example of policies with these kinds of effects is 
the variable levy of the EC The variable levy is a variable 
import tariff set as the difference between the world 
price and a predetermined EC import price. Because the 
levy can change from day to day, imported agricultural 
products covered by this policy can never enter the EC 
at a price less than the EC import price, known as the 
threshold price (Peterson 1985). Thus, if the world price 
increases or decreases, the variable levy is adjusted so 
that the price within the EC is not affected by the world 
price change. On the other hand, a shock within the EC 
can be shifted to the world market, thereby increasing 
world price instability. Suppose the weather in the EC 
has been particularly good and the corn harvest is much 
larger than normal. Because internal prices cannot fall 
below the threshold price, EC corn consumption will 
not change. The only effect of the supply shock will be 
to reduce EC imports which will tend to depress the 
world price. Thus, a policy such as the EC variable levy 
reduces instability internally by shifting the burden of 
adjustment to the world market. 
In terms of price stability, the least disruptive trade 
barrier is an ordinary tariff (Blyth). An ad valorem tariff, 
for example, allows fluctuations in world price to be 
transmitted to the internal market. Also, variation in 
domestic output is not prevented from causing a decline 
in internal prices. The impact of an internal supply shock 
is at least partially absorbed by the market in the import-
ing country where the shock occurred. Import quotas 
and VERs lead to greater world price instability because, 
as with the variable levy, quantities imported are limited 
to a predetermined amount (Blyth). In general, trade 
barriers tend to increase instability on world markets by 
shifting the burden of adjustment out of the internal 
market. On the other hand, variability originating in the 
world market is more likely to disrupt domestic markets 
iffree trade exists than ifcountries employ trade barriers. 
The way in which quality restrictions affect the 
dynamics of prices and markets depends on the specific 
situation. If the restrictions eliminate trade in a given 
commodity, any shocks must be absorbed entirely by 
the internal markets. Although an autarkic country is 
unaffected by world market variation, it is unable to shift 
a portion of the adjustment burden due to internally 
generated shocks to the world market. The result ma 
be increased internal instability. To the extent that quality 
restrictions lead some countries to cease participating 
in world trade, the world market will be thinner and 
more vulnerable to destabilizing shocks. Often, trade 
barriers stabilize internal markets and destabilize world 
markets. Quality restrictions may have the disadvantage 
of contributing to greater instability in both domestic 
and world markets. 
In summary, quality restrictions used as barriers to 
trade have several disadvantages compared to more con-
ventional barriers. From the regulating country's point 
of view, they reduce the choices available to consumers, 
generate no quota rents, and may contribute to increased 
domestic instability For the rest of the world, quality 
restrictions frequently are a discriminatory barrier affect-
ing some, but not necessarily all, exporting countries. If 
they are highly restrictive, the result may be greater 
instability in world markets and larger efficiency losses 
than with more conventional trade barriers. In other 
words, quality restrictions may be the least desirable 
way to protect producers. If the motivation for imple-
menting a quality restriction is to protect consumers, 
the environment, or livestock from harmful substances, 
these disadvantages are likely to be of little concern. 
However, if the primary motivation for implementing a 
quality restriction is to protect producers from foreign 
competition, better methods are available to accomplish 
that objective, at least from the economic perspective. 
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